Commentary: Rocke, Lisbon

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1st Place Commentary:  SSgt. Ethan Rocke

1st Place Commentary: SSgt. Ethan Rocke

Category sponsored by the Florida Chapter

1st Place: SSgt. Ethan Rocke, Los Angeles Public Affairs
Rocke calls his piece “Death of the Marksman” and writes that the “new rifle qualification scoring system elevates mediocre shooters and drastically lowers Corps’ standards.” In his analysis of the system he argues that the aggregate scoring system “has degraded the distinction of what an expert shooter is by Marine standards… lowering standards is something Marines don’t do.”

2nd Place: GySgt. Bill Lisbon, MCAS Yuma

Winning stories are published below

1st Place: SSgt. Ethan Rocke, Los Angeles Public Affairs

Death of the Marksman

New rifle qualification aggregate scoring system elevates mediocre shooters, lowers Corps’ standards
Say goodbye to the Marine Corps marksman.

From now on, all Marines will be either sharpshooters or experts.

Those lines may as well be written into the new Marine Corps Combat Marksmanship Program order, which has effectively lowered the Corps’ standard for excellence in rifle marksmanship.

That may just be my humble opinion, but I am predicting, and hoping, that once Corps officials run the numbers and analyze the statistical evidence of how many Marines are earning a classification of sharpshooter or expert now compared to before our rifle qualification standards changed, they will come to the same conclusion.

The problem is that the new aggregate scoring system combines a shooter’s scores from the fundamental marksmanship portion, Table 1, and the combat marksmanship portion, Table 2, and that aggregate score now determines a shooter’s badge classification.

The new system eliminates, on the fundamental marksmanship course, the minimum score a shooter must receive to earn a classification above marksman. Shooters used to have to obtain a minimum score of 210 or 220 (out of a possible 250) on the fundamental course to earn a classification of sharpshooter or expert respectively. Those days are no more.

The aggregate score minimums are now 305-350 for expert, 280-304 for sharpshooter, and 250-279 for marksman.

Under the new system, a Marine can leave the fundamental course a marksman, shooting anywhere from 205 to 209, and still elevate his classification straight past sharpshooter to expert by shooting anywhere from a 96 to the maximum score of 100.

I completed my annual rifle qualification a few weeks ago, and I was highly disappointed by the droves of Marines who were giddy over the fact that they were able to make up for a mediocre performance on Table 1 with a decent performance on Table 2.

Two Marines from my office were on the range with me. Both had never qualified above marksman. Both shot below a 210 on the fundamental course. Both left the range sharpshooters. This type of outcome was rampant across the entire range detail.

One Marine on my detail shot a 193 on Table 1, just three points above the minimum score needed to pass the table, and still walked away from Table 2 with a brand new shiny sharpshooter badge. This amused him, just like it amused all the other Marines who walked away from the range this year with a new notion of what is average, excellent or outstanding when it comes to a Marine’s ability with a rifle. The fact that Marines are literally laughing at this new system speaks volumes about its impact on our standards.

I collected data on 176 shooters who qualified with the new system on Okinawa. Of those 176 shooters, 93 qualified as experts, 53 qualified sharpshooter and seven qualified marksman. Twenty did not qualify, either because they did not meet minimum standards or because they were dropped from their range details for other reasons such as faulty weapons.

I don’t have older data to compare those numbers against, but I’m betting, based on strong anecdotal evidence, that experts were not always in the strong majority, and marksman were not always a virtually nonexistent minority.

The new Marine Corps Combat Marksmanship order articulates the reason behind the implementation of Table 2 into annual qualification training: “Combat ready Marines must be … highly proficient in the use of firearms. Well-trained Marines have the confidence required to deliver accurate fire under the most adverse battle conditions. The rifle is the primary means by which Marines accomplish their mission … The objective of marksmanship training is to develop, sustain, and improve individual combat shooting skills.”

I agree 100 percent with all that and am glad the Corps has implemented Table 2 into annual qualification. It is valuable training.
What I don’t agree with is the way the aggregate scoring system has degraded the distinction of what an expert shooter is by Marine standards.
Under these new standards, the Corps has opened the doors and welcomed everyone to the party: “Chips and dip to the right, sharpshooter and expert badges to the left. Please check any sense of what excellence is at the door.”

If the aggregate system is here to stay, it needs to be revised, and the standard needs to be raised. The Table 1 minimum scores for each classification need to come back at the least. That alone might be enough, but we should also consider the fact that a shooter’s proficiency with a rifle should be measured consistently. We used to require 84 percent hits for sharpshooter and 88 percent hits for expert on Table 1. Maybe we need to require the same minimums on both tables.

Some Marines might shudder at that elevated standard, which would mean a bad day of combat marksmanship shooting could mean the loss of a higher badge classification. What those Marines should shudder at is that right now we have a system that has drastically lowered our standards.

Last time I checked, lowering standards is something Marines don’t do.

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2nd Place: GySgt. Bill Lisbon, MCAS Yuma

Death toll ticker focus out of context, exploitive

On Sunday, the 4,000th U.S. service member died in Iraq—just in case you didn’t hear. I’m guessing you did, given the bombardment of media coverage received and anti-war protests mounted across the country.

True, every service member and civilian loss is significant, and I am not belittling anyone’s life, whether it is number 4,000 or 57 or 2,424.
The way the civilian media fixates on each numerical milestone of troop deaths—like someone watching their car’s odometer right before it reaches 100,000 miles—then parades it as a significant news story is exploitive and unfair.

In war, people die. All the body armor, ballistic goggles, mine-resistant vehicles, QuikClot, unmanned aerial vehicles and bomb disposal robots isn’t going to stop that. So covering service member deaths caused during a war with an “unthinkable tragedy” angle takes them out of context.
Speaking on context, if 4,000 deaths after five years of war makes headlines, wouldn’t the coverage of bigger, more seemingly senseless killers make for more responsible journalism?

In 2006, 17,602 people died in alcohol-related crashes in the United States, according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Over five years, that kills an average of 2,200 percent more Americans than the war in Iraq did. Why aren’t there massive protests in front of bars calling for an end to the senseless deaths?

Break it down other ways. In 2006, 4,810 motorcyclists died in crashes, according to NHTSA statistics. More than 10,000 traffic fatalities were between 16 and 24 years old. Nearly 5,000 pedestrians died just by walking down the street. Why isn’t that making the front page? Why aren’t we demanding the auto manufacturers to add armor to our cars? Why aren’t we outfitting our pedestrians with Kevlar?

In 2006, motor vehicle traffic crashes killed 42,642 overall. That’s 10 times the war deaths in one year on our own soil. Who was number 4,000? Or number 40,000? It’s probably hard to keep track of that because someone dies in a car crash every 12 minutes. Shouldn’t the nation focus on electing a president who will pull our motorists out of that quagmire?

I recently worked at a recruiting station, where recruiters commonly heard parents refuse to let their children—if you want to call people at least 17 years old “children”—join the Marine Corps because they didn’t want them to be killed in Iraq. Comparatively, the United States is far more fatal. In 2004 alone, 4,767 teens ages 16 to 19 died of injuries caused by motor vehicle crashes, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

One could even argue that parents are more dangerous than Iraq. In 2005, 1,460 children ages 17 and under died because of child abuse and neglect, according to the CDC. Multiply that over five years. Annually, even some accidents kill more Americans than fighting overseas. In 2004, the CDC reported 3,308 unintentional fatal drownings in the United States, averaging nine per day. In 2006, fires claimed 2,580 lives. Hurricane Katrina killed 1,836 people in 2005. The war in Iraq that year: 846 U.S. troops.

Farming, of all things, isn’t quite as fatal, but approximately 2,500 people were killed over the past five years.
Maybe you think it’s absurd to compare war and farming, but is it any less absurd than highlighting 4,000 war deaths without comparing it to more than 40,000 people killed driving to the mall? Only if those 4,000 lives are being remembered for their sacrifices for the country, instead of used to make a biased point of the human costs, which seems to be more the case.

Yet, there is some consolation. All the free press and protests remind me that the United States still stands and the Marine Corps continues to defends it.

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